Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: an Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration. Programs Series: NIJ Research Report Published: January 1996 122 pages 265,840 bytes Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: An Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration Programs A Final Summary Report Presented to The National Institute of Justice By: Blair B. Bourque, Roberta C. Cronin, Frank R. Pearson, Daniel B. Felker, Mei Han, and Sarah M. Hill Supported under Award #92-DD-CX-K043 from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. ----------------------------------- Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction The Boot Camp Movement Why Boot Camps for Juveniles? The OJJDP Demonstration Program The Boot Camp Evaluation The Evaluation Report Chapter 2 The Design and Initial Implementation of the Boot Camps The Boot Camp Program Design The Three Prototype Juvenile Boot Camps Organizational Structure and Management Program Design Chapter 3 Boot Camp Selection Phase OJJDP's Guidelines for Selection Selection Criteria at the Program Sites Selection Process Chapter 4 Boot Camp: The Intensive Training Phase Boot Camp Philosophy and Design Program Capacity and Utilization Facilities Management and Staffing Program Content During Boot Camp Participant Misconduct and Discipline Boot Camp Graduation and Termination Rates Attitudes of Youths Toward the Boot Camp Regimens Implementation Issues Chapter 5 Aftercare Programs Parameters Set by OJJDP Local Aftercare Program Designs The Aftercare Programs in Operation Mechanisms for Monitoring and Disciplining Youths Implementation Issues Chapter 6 Changes During the Boot Camp Phase Evidence of Change During the Boot Camp Phase Evidence of Change During the Aftercare Phase Program Costs Chapter 7 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations Key Implementation Findings Conclusions Recommendations Bibliography ------------------------------------------ Chapter 1 Introduction One of the most closely watched developments in corrections over the last few years has been the proliferation of boot camp programs. Characterized by a strong emphasis on military structure, drill, and discipline, these programs offer a new twist on the use of residential programs for convicted criminals. A movement that began with a single 50- bed program in Georgia in 1983 (Parent, 1989), boot camps now operate in more than half the States. In the fall of 1990, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in the U.S. Department of Justice launched a demonstration program to examine the feasibility, appropriateness, and promise of the boot camp model for juvenile offenders. In 1991, three sites were chosen to participate in the demonstration. At the same time, the American Institutes for Research (AIR) and the Institute for Criminological Research (ICR) at Rutgers University were selected by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to conduct an evaluation of these demonstration programs. This final report on the AIR/ICR evaluation presents observations of the first 18 months of the demonstration period. Detailed descriptions of the programs at each site, including the assumptions, rationales, and contexts that determined how each site went about developing a program are presented. Comparing the major components of the camps, the report discusses how well the programs succeeded in the short term-- during the boot camp as well as the subsequent aftercare program. The report ends with an analysis of the promise of boot camps as an effective and appropriate intermediate sanction for juveniles and general considerations for improving their structure and processes. The Boot Camp Movement The correctional system is often characterized as a system in crisis (Byrne, Lurigio, and Petersilia, 1992). In a little over a decade the adult prisoner population has grown a remarkable 150 percent (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993). Both the rate of prison incarceration and the absolute number of inmates reached their highest levels ever in 1992 (American Correctional Association, 1993). The surge in inmate populations in part reflects a widespread disillusionment with the potential for rehabilitating offenders in the community, a disillusionment that began to take hold in the 1970's (Martinson, 1974; Palmer, 1992). Throughout much of the 1980's, public concern with safety and with giving offenders their "just deserts," not rehabilitation, dominated sentencing policy. To many, incarceration seemed the most natural way to punish offenders and protect society. By 1990, however, the effects of this policy were becoming apparent. Prisons were straining at the seams and correctional costs were spiraling higher, yet crime was not diminishing. Meanwhile, new studies were causing some policymakers and practitioners to reappraise the potential of rehabilitative approaches (Palmer, 1992). In this climate there emerged a vigorous interest in "intermediate sanctions" that could satisfy the public's demand for protection and punishment without further taxing correctional facilities and budgets. Intermediate sanctions are generally defined as sentencing alternatives that fall between the poles of simple probation and incarceration (Morris and Tonry, 1990; Toby, 1982, 1984). The term embraces a wide variety of correctional approaches, including intensive supervision, fines, restitution, and community service, often used in combination. Most intermediate sanctions claim multiple goals: saving money, deterring crime, protecting the public, and rehabilitating offenders (Byrne et al., 1992). Boot camps are a relatively new addition to the intermediate sanctions menu. Billed as "one of the most recent and exciting forms of intermediate sanctions being adopted by the States" (Office of Justice Programs, 1990), they consist of a relatively short period of incarceration in a quasi-military environment, followed by a period of supervision in the community. The first camp, the "Special Alternative Incarceration" program, opened in Georgia in 1983, an outgrowth of discussions between the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections and a local judge; both were dissatisfied with sentencing options then available (Parent, 1989). Oklahoma and Mississippi soon followed suit, opening paramilitary camps for adult offenders. By 1993, there were at least 59 State and 10 local boot camps for adults operating in 29 States (Cronin, 1994). In addition to their considerable popularity within the correctional system, boot camps have demonstrated extraordinary appeal to the general public. Experts on boot camp programming nationwide note that boot camps are a "natural" for media coverage, which tends to focus on the programs' disciplinary aspects and appeals to "get tough" sentiments. In a culture where many people view military service as a formative experience, the public also seems to intuitively grasp the rehabilitative rationale for the programs (Parent, 1989; MacKenzie and Parent, 1992). Why Boot Camps for Juveniles? The notion of developing boot camps for juvenile offenders evolved logically as the juvenile system increasingly faced pressures similar to those forcing change in the adult system. Although the juvenile justice system nationwide is not as severely burdened as the adult system, it exhibits the same general trends. Juveniles in custody for delinquent offenses increased 35 percent from 1978 to 1989, a period when the youth population of the United States declined by 11 percent (OJJDP, 1992). Thus, satisfactory alternatives to long- term institutionalization are as welcome in the juvenile system as they are in the adult system. Furthermore, age groups served by the juvenile and adult systems overlap. The age of criminal adulthood is 16 or less in some States, and in most States certain categories of juvenile offenders can be tried and sentenced in the adult system. Moreover, a significant proportion of the adult criminal justice system's clientele consists of persons in their teens and early 20's. This is especially true of adult boot camps, which disproportionately recruit offenders who are young and fit enough to tolerate their programs' physical regimen. Thus, if boot camps hold promise as effective interventions for young adults, it is plausible to think that they might be appropriate interventions for older juveniles as well. In some respects, the harsh image of a boot camp regimen appears at odds with a juvenile justice system that, at least in theory, tends to emphasize "rehabilitation" over punishment or public safety. Since the Illinois statute establishing the first juvenile court in 1899, the juvenile justice system in the United States has been influenced strongly by a rehabilitative philosophy (Schlossman, 1983). Delinquents were considered to have lacked proper parental guidance, which the juvenile court judge, acting in loco parentis, would attempt to supply. The juvenile system, including probation officers attached to the juvenile court and what were initially called "training schools," was intended to remedy parental deficiencies in upbringing, the presumed reason for bad behavior in adolescence. Notwithstanding this ideological focus on rehabilitation, the juvenile justice system also has traditionally included discipline. The original training schools were often run in a military style. Custodial institutions for juveniles were often constructed with bars and cells that seemed punitive to the casual observer. The closest approximation to current U.S. boot camp programs--British detention centers--were developed to deal with adolescents rather than with adult offenders. Faced with an upsurge of adolescent crime following World War II, quasi- military "detention centers" were set up in England and Wales under the hypothesis that "a short, sharp shock" to adolescents early in their criminal careers might nip their anti-social tendencies in the bud. When evaluative research produced disappointing recidivism rates for the detention center youths, plans were announced in 1979 to establish two even tougher detention centers: . . . life will be conducted at a brisk tempo. Much greater emphasis will be put on hard and constructive activities, on discipline and tidiness, on self-respect and respect for those in authority. We will introduce on a regular basis drill, parades and inspections. Offenders will have to earn their limited privileges by good behavior . . . (Thornton, et al., 1984). Delinquents were not the only groups singled out for these quasi-military approaches. Military schools have served for many years as an acceptable solution to schooling middle-class adolescents, particularly those seemingly on a troubled path. In any case, the U.S. juvenile justice system has come under increasing attack for its perceived laxity in treating youth and its tendency to emphasize rehabilitation over other correctional goals. Boot camps, in contrast to many other alternatives, offer a particularly attractive package--the chance to pursue rehabilitative goals in an environment that does not appear to coddle delinquents. The OJJDP Demonstration Program In this context, OJJDP initiated a demonstration program to explore whether boot camp programs for adult offenders could be adapted for male juvenile offenders. The demonstration would provide a means to "develop, test, and disseminate information on a prototypical juvenile boot camp as an intermediate sanction program" (OJJDP, 1990). In particular, these programs would identify adaptations to the adult boot camp model to allow boot camps to operate within State or local juvenile justice systems and to make their programming age-appropriate. Despite the growing popularity of boot camp programs in the adult correctional system, the concept had not taken hold in the juvenile system until OJJDP's demonstration program was under way (Toby and Pearson, 1992). In September 1991, OJJDP awarded grants to three groups to develop boot camp programs. Applicants from Cleveland, Ohio; Mobile, Alabama; and Denver, Colorado, were selected through a competitive process. They each received an initial award for 18 months with the potential for a continuance award for an additional 18 months. Grantees spent the first 6 months of the demonstration designing the intervention and then opened their boot camps in March or April 1992. The AIR/ICR evaluation focuses on the demonstration experience during this 18-month period. The Boot Camp Evaluation The OJJDP boot camp demonstration program included a plan for a 2-year evaluation to be sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The evaluation was awarded at about the same time as demonstration sites were selected, in October 1991. During the first year of the evaluation, the Institute for Criminological Research at Rutgers University was the prime grantee, with the American Institutes for Research as its subcontractor. In the second year, the relationship was reversed. The scope of the evaluation of the juvenile boot camps narrowed over the course of the study. Initially, the plan was to conduct both a process and an impact evaluation. However, by the second year it became apparent that sufficient resources would not be available to conduct the impact evaluation, nor to include all of the process measurements envisioned in the evaluation's original design. As a result, the design was scaled back to focus only on process issues. The core of the assessment was a management information system that captured administrative data as offenders progressed through the demonstration program. o At intake, grantees were asked to collect information on participants' demographic characteristics, delinquent history, details of instant (current) offense, disposition of current case, educational history, employment status, living arrangements, and criminality of family members and friends. o At the beginning and end of the 90-day term, boot camp staff were asked to rate participants' performance on a number of dimensions. o At the end of the 90-day term, boot camp staff were asked to report participants' date of graduation or reasons for leaving the program prematurely, any serious infractions of the rules, any honors or awards, and any special services received. o Five months after boot camp graduation, grantees were asked to provide an update on participants' status, including whether they were still participating in boot camp aftercare and, if not, the reason for nonparticipation; their residence and educational placement during aftercare; and any serious disciplinary infractions. At this point, boot camp participants who were still active in the program were asked to rate their experiences, as well as changes in their attitudes, values, behavior, and expectations. o Finally, at the end of the demonstration program in 1993, grantees were asked to provide a status report on all first-year platoons, indicating which youths had completed both boot camp and aftercare, as well as reasons for noncompletion. The grantees designated various staff to assist in obtaining this information and researchers worked with them to fill in gaps and resolve any inconsistencies among data sources. In addition, some sites were able to supplement the basic management information with data they had collected on physical fitness, educational performance, and participants' attitudes. Data collection covered all participants admitted to boot camp in the first year of the program--119 in Cleveland, 76 in Denver, and 122 in Mobile. To supplement these data sources, researchers made an average of five site visits to each program, spoke with participants, and interviewed program staff and representatives of the agencies that constituted each program. Researchers also kept in frequent contact with key program staff by telephone throughout the demonstration. The Evaluation Report The remainder of this report presents the results of the process evaluation of the three boot camp demonstration programs. Chapter 2 describes the basic program design in more detail and provides an overview of the individual programs. Chapter 3 presents each site's selection process (the procedures each program used to choose candidates for participation in the program), the characteristics of program participants, and the characteristics of those who failed to complete the program successfully. Detailed descriptions of the programs' boot camp phase are presented in chapter 4. A discussion of the aftercare programs in each site appears in chapter 5. Chapter 6 offers an analysis of observable changes in boot camp participants during the program period and the program completion and attrition rates. Chapter 7 presents conclusions and considerations for the design of boot camps for juveniles and provides suggestions for further research. Chapter 2. The Design and Initial Implementation of the Boot Camps Chapter 2 describes the overall design of the OJJDP boot camp demonstration program for juvenile offenders and provides a brief overview of the three programs developed within that framework. Chapter 2 also discusses issues that arose during the early stages, as the sites planned their programs and served the first few cohorts of youths. The Boot Camp Program Design The general framework for demonstration programs was set forth in OJJDP's program announcement, which appeared in the Federal Register on July 12, 1990. The purpose of the initiative was to develop and evaluate a juvenile boot camp program. Similar to a typical boot camp program for adults, it would serve adjudicated, nonviolent offenders and emphasize discipline and work. It would also emphasize "treatment," a core concern of virtually all correctional programming for juvenile offenders and a key element in some adult boot camps. OJJDP's agenda for the demonstration programs was ambitious. The programs would: o Serve as a cost-effective sanction. o Promote basic, traditional, moral values and instill a work ethic. o Provide discipline to youths through physical conditioning and teamwork. o Promote literacy and increase academic achievement. o Include activities and resources to reduce drug and alcohol abuse. o Encourage participants to become productive, law-abiding citizens. o Ensure that juvenile offenders are punished and held accountable. OJJDP emphasized that the demonstration programs were to constitute an intermediate sanction (i.e., punishment less severe than long-term institutionalization, but more severe than immediate supervised release). Although the programs were to ensure public safety, they were not to be used for violent or serious repeat offenders deserving long-term institutionalization (Federal Register, 1990). Any public or private organization was eligible to submit a bid for funding, but preference was given to proposals that involved collaborative efforts between public and private agencies and to consortia involving service agencies and local juvenile justice systems. Funds were to be awarded in two 18-month periods. The first award would cover a 6-month planning effort and a 12-month implementation period. The second award would support program operations and allow programs to develop a training manual and a package of technical assistance materials that would explain the methods and approaches used to implement the programs. The program announcement called for applicants to design programs with four phases: selection, intensive training, preparedness, and accountability. Applicants were free to set their own standards for the duration of the program, except that the intensive training or boot camp phase was expected to last at least 90 days. Selection During the first phase, selection, grantees would identify a sufficient number of prospective program participants and establish their eligibility. According to OJJDP, to participate in the demonstration program a youth must: o Be adjudicated by the juvenile court and be awaiting implementation of the court disposition. o Be categorized as at high risk of continuing delinquency or of abusing drugs or alcohol. o Be under the age of 18. o Have no history of mental illness. o Not be considered violent or have a history of involvement in violent crimes. o Not be an escape risk. o Demonstrate motivation to participate in the program. OJJDP offered no specific definition or methodology for determining which prospective participants were violent or an escape risk or for measuring their motivation to participate. Grant applicants were to apply their own criteria for selecting program participants. As part of selection, each grantee would be required to randomly assign eligible youth to either the demonstration program or to a control group, making it possible to conduct a rigorous impact evaluation. Intensive Training This phase of the program, what is usually referred to by the term "boot camp," was to involve rigorous physical conditioning, discipline, activities to instill confidence, self-esteem, teamwork and leadership, and it was to last no less than 90 days. Programs were expected to adapt some portion of a military-style system of dress, drills, courtesy, discipline, and physical training. They were also expected to conduct comprehensive diagnostic assessments, provide participants academic training, teach employment skills, provide participants drug and alcohol assessments and counseling, and provide them other kinds of counseling during the intensive training phase of the program. Programs were given considerable flexibility in the implementation of intensive training. Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 4, each program also varied in the degree to which it adopted military procedures. The programs also varied the proportion of time devoted to physical training, work, drill and ceremony, education, and other support services. Preparedness During the third phase, preparedness, OJJDP specified that the programs return the participants to a community setting with intensive supervision and aftercare. Each participant was to have an individualized plan and be accountable for accomplishing it. The program staff, with the help of agencies and volunteers in the community, were to provide the various support services that the young offenders need to resist negative influences in their communities, find work, and complete academic programs. The program and agency staff were directed to conduct drug testing, prevention/treatment counseling, and physical conditioning and provide support to participants' families. Participants failing to pursue academic and vocational training or employment, and those not participating in community services and treatment, would be terminated from the program pending a review by the presiding court. Accountability OJJDP envisioned a final phase of aftercare in which youths were to be held accountable for their behavior through a systematic restitution and community service plan. During this stage the services and activities of the preparedness phase would be continued. However, youths would be subject to less intensive monitoring and supervision, including reduced aftercare time commitments. The Underlying Rationale Although each grantee was expected to develop a specific program within the context of local policy, preferences, and resource constraints, the OJJDP program announcement delineated general requirements for development of the programs. The expectation was that the programs would marshal resources--people, physical facilities, counseling and educational materials, agreements with social and community agencies--to systematically implement programming that would positively affect participants' short- and long-term attitudes and behavior. A distinguishing characteristic was the expectation that the intensive training phase of activities would reflect and be conducted in a distinctively military-like setting. Embedded in boot camp theory are the twin themes of discipline and development. The implicit hypothesis is that external discipline fosters the self-discipline needed to engage in, and benefit from, program treatment and development components. The hypothesized logic chain begins with uniformed drill instructors carefully selected and trained to give offenders strict military-like discipline and supervision. Drill instructors who brook no nonsense from program participants and consistently enforce prescribed manners of behavior are instrumental in establishing the boot camp's structured environment. Program participants exposed to this environment will learn self-discipline, resistance to peer pressure, and commitment to traditional values. Over time, these personal changes will enhance feelings of self-worth and reinforce socially desirable behaviors such as seeking and holding jobs, continuing education, and resisting criminal activities. Within the program's disciplined structure, participants are better able to focus on and actively engage in educational (remedial or otherwise) courses, life skills training, and counseling. These, too, enhance feelings of worth and accomplishment, instill an appreciation and propensity for positive behavior, and improve chances for resisting damaging peer pressure and criminal behavior. The Three Prototype Juvenile Boot Camps OJJDP awarded grants to three teams of public and private agencies to develop prototype demonstration programs for juvenile offenders. These teams were: o The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Cleveland, Ohio, in association with the North American Family Institute. o The Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile, Alabama, in association with the Strickland Youth Center of Mobile County Juvenile Court and the University of South Alabama. o The Colorado Division of Youth Services, Denver, Colorado, in association with New Pride, Inc. All three teams cited similar systemic problems driving their decisions to bid. These problems-- rapidly rising numbers of juvenile arrests, increased involvement of youth with drugs, overcrowded juvenile facilities, and the expense of institutionalizing youth--mirrored problems found in most of the country's juvenile justice systems. The demonstration programs were viewed as a possible means to alleviate overcrowding and still provide innovative services. The primary goal of Cleveland's demonstration program was to alleviate severe overcrowding in juvenile correctional facilities while providing adequate supervision and treatment. Although Ohio's Juvenile Code encourages supervision and rehabilitation in a family environment, separating the child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety (Kurtz and Giannelli, 1989), in 1991, the State had the second largest number of children in public custody in the Nation (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994). Reducing this population was a major concern in Ohio. By decreasing time in custody, boot camps would lower institutional care costs. Newspaper expos‚s on overcrowding and the resulting diminished ability to provide rehabilitation or recruit enough qualified trained staff increased the State's interest in boot camps and other intermediate sanctions. The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court was also eager to have correctional alternatives for the increasing numbers of offenders they confronted, particularly alternatives that showed promise in reducing recidivism. Similarly, the Denver program was developed during a period when Colorado's juvenile correctional facilities were under extreme pressure and facing critical public scrutiny. At the time the program developed its proposal to OJJDP, the State's juvenile training schools were estimated to be operating at 120 percent of capacity. Officials were concerned that the practice of diverting juvenile delinquents from secure residential correctional facilities was undermining local officials' efforts to sanction delinquent behavior. They were also concerned that the public believed that youths were being returned to the community without any punishment for their crimes. Interest in the Mobile program stemmed from the increasing number of juveniles arrested in Alabama each year for engaging in some form of criminal behavior. Juvenile court and law enforcement officials in Mobile believed that these youths would have a chance of changing their lives for the better if they could be temporarily removed from their home environment and exposed to a more positive lifestyle. Moreover, elected officials and civic leaders in the area believed that community services and juvenile justice resources could be meshed to meet the needs of troubled youth. The demonstration program seemed a plausible way of accomplishing this goal. Additionally, the Strickland Youth Center had experimented with a 2-week "mini" boot camp in 1991 to explore the feasibility of the model. Organizational Structure and Management As was suggested in the OJJDP program announcement, all three programs included both public and private sector agencies. Public sector involvement was critical in resolving issues that involved the court or probation and correctional agencies. Private sector involvement added skills, resources, and, in some cases, facilities to the program. Together, the partners offered each other a sounding board on policies and procedures and a synergy that proved quite useful to a high- visibility program. In Cleveland, the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court contracted with Massachusetts-based North American Family Institute (NAFI) to run its program's boot camp and aftercare phases. The juvenile court coordinated all program activities, conducted planning, research and evaluation, and selected participants. The court paid one manager out of grant funds to oversee the selection process. NAFI was responsible for operating both the boot camp and aftercare demonstration program, training staff, and providing technical assistance. Similarly, a public agency, the Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS), was the prime contractor in Denver. DYS contracted with New Pride, Inc., a private, nonprofit corporation with a long history of providing community-based services to high-risk delinquents, to operate the program. DYS provided two client managers and a project coordinator to oversee program operations, handle selection, and administer case management for boot camp participants throughout their sojourn in the program. New Pride operated both the program's boot camp and aftercare phases. In Mobile, the demonstration program was a partnership of the Strickland Youth Center of the Mobile County Court, the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Mobile (B&GC), and the University of South Alabama. Unlike in Cleveland and Denver, in Mobile the private partner (B&GC) was the prime contractor. However, Mobile County's chief probation officer and the executive director of B&GC served as co-project directors. They jointly supervised the director of the program, who in turn managed both the boot camp and aftercare phases. Strickland Youth Center managed the intake and selection process and dedicated three full- time probation officers to the program. These officers provided case management supervision for youths in boot camp and aftercare. Program Design In designing their programs, the three sites adhered to the broad program parameters set forth in the program announcement. Each of the programs considered selection to be the first stage of the process, screening youths against a set of preordained criteria. Each program implemented a 90-day boot camp on the premises of an existing youth correctional facility. The central feature of their camps was the use of quasi-military structure, discipline, customs, and activities. Each program also developed an aftercare program, although none chose to split the program into the specific preparedness and accountability phases that OJJDP had envisioned. Both Cleveland and Denver did, however, divide aftercare into phases that differed in intensity of surveillance and services. Overall, the sites bought into a general philosophy regarding boot camps that would permeate both their boot camp and aftercare programs: o The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court's partner, NAFI, employed the "normative model," which attempts to move youths who have gravitated toward antisocial normative systems back toward healthy functioning. NAFI incorporated only those aspects of military boot camps that were compatible with a safe, structured environment--physical exercise, military customs and courtesies, and group punishment. The program's cornerstone was techniques, such as guided group interaction, that NAFI had employed in other institutions. The military veneer provided the program with straightforward rules, standards, and expectations. NAFI's philosophy permeated both the boot camp and aftercare programs; the military aspects were limited for the most part to the residential boot camp. o The Colorado Division of Youth Services and New Pride saw the boot camp program as an opportunity to diverge dramatically from their existing treatment modalities. By applying a military model that deliberately made boot camp a high-stress experience, they would set high standards for behavior and hold youths accountable to those standards. Unlike counselors in other programs, strict drill instructors would intentionally play a tough role. The Denver program rested on a theory that youths ultimately would perceive the DI's as positive role models and internalize their standards of conduct. Once youths were released from the boot camp, however, the strict military environment would be replaced by a "prep school" that required youths to wear coats and ties and that employed an entirely educational emphasis. o In Mobile, the Strickland Youth Center supported the discipline, regimentation, and emphasis on traditional values inherent in the boot camp model. Mobile planned to employ military components to gain the attention of youths and to increase their focus on activities and goals. Disciplined behavior and exposure to DI role models would ultimately improve the self- discipline and concentration of youths, who would then be more receptive to individualized education and other rehabilitative components. Youths would continue to draw upon their improved self- discipline once they were released to the tutoring and recreational programs of the Boys and Girls Club. In short, all three programs saw the military model as an avenue for creating a secure, structured environment that would permit youths to make other changes. All three programs also viewed drill instructors as positive role models for youths to emulate. Denver and Mobile depended on the external discipline of the military to produce internal controls. Cleveland aimed to improve internal controls via a peer culture that established a positive normative system in each platoon. This system would continue to be nourished during the aftercare period. The next three chapters describe in detail the program implemented at each site. Chapter 3 discusses the selection process and criteria employed by the sites, as well as the types of youths selected for participation. Chapter 4 discusses the three boot camp programs and variations in the degree of militarism they employed, and chapter 5 explores the three starkly different aftercare models implemented by the programs. Chapter 3. Boot Camp Selection Phase According to the framework outlined in the previous chapter, the first phase of the program was participant selection. This chapter describes the screening criteria developed by the programs, the selection processes they employed, and the characteristics of the youths these criteria and processes identified during the first year of operation (April 1992 through March 1993). Because the demonstration programs were conceived to be intermediate sanctions, they were designed to serve midlevel offenders--youths whose criminal behavior warranted some intervention more restrictive than probation but not serious enough to prompt long-term institutionalization. Defining these offenders was a critical question for the programs, in terms of both public support and ability to work successfully with youths. Drawing the line too close to the probation end of the spectrum would raise questions about fairness in sentencing for youths whose criminal records were normally minor enough to warrant a lesser sentence. Net-widening--selecting youths who would otherwise have been placed in less expensive, nonresidential placements--also would reduce the program's potential for lowering costs. On the other hand, if the programs were used simply as an alternative to longer term institutional placements, it would be more difficult to make the case that the programs punished youths and held them accountable for their behaviors. Questions might be raised about whether the programs were shrinking the net by reducing the amount of time youths were incarcerated. A perception that boot camps were diversion programs, providing a less restrictive alternative for youths, might well erode some of the public support enjoyed by the programs. In fact, the three demonstration programs came to different decisions about which youths to define as midlevel offenders. That decisionmaking is reflected in the type of youths who participated in the boot camps. OJJDP's Guidelines for Selection In its program announcement, OJJDP described the appropriate boot camp target population as "adjudicated, nonviolent, juvenile offenders who are under 18 years of age" (Federal Register, 1990). Violence was to be determined on the basis of offense-based criteria, including homicide, rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and arson (Summary of Solicitation Workshop Proceedings, 1990). In addition, the programs were to exclude "serious, habitual offenders who ordinarily would be assigned to a correctional institution" (Summary of Solicitation Workshop Proceedings, 1990). However, the target population was to "have a history of offending with prior attempts at intervention that appear to have failed" (Federal Register, 1990), placing them at high risk of further involvement in the juvenile or criminal justice systems. The program announcement and backup application materials did not set objective criteria for "serious, habitual offenders," nor did they clarify whether the programs were to exclude all offenders normally sentenced to correctional facilities, or only violent and habitual offenders who would be so sentenced. In the absence of precise definitions, the programs were able to interpret the guidelines to fit a broad range of offenders. Except for the dictate that candidates have an adjudication and have failed to benefit from previous interventions, the criteria served to exclude offenders who were too serious or violent rather than to define youths who had committed offenses serious enough to warrant inclusion in the target population. Public safety was cited as a reason for excluding violent youths, because the boot camps were designed as minimum security institutions. The ambiguity in threshold criteria indicated that there was less concern about whether boot camps would result in more youths in residential placement than about whether serious and violent offenders would be released prematurely into the community. In addition to exclusion on the basis of youths' criminal records (i.e., serious and violent offenses), programs were to screen out candidates who had histories of mental illness and who were considered escape risks. Programs could elect to serve all juveniles, or they could focus on one of two groups: youths 15 years old and younger or youths 15 to 17 years old. All candidates were to "demonstrate motivation to participate in the program" (Federal Register, 1990). Because they were funded under OJJDP's program development process, the demonstration programs also had research requirements for testing their effects. The guidelines required that youths be randomly assigned to experimental or control conditions. This requirement meant that the programs had to screen and select twice the number of youths they needed to fill their available slots. Selection Criteria at the Program Sites Within the broad screening parameters outlined by OJJDP, the three programs defined their own criteria and procedures for identifying candidates. Only males were eligible for participation. All three programs chose to serve the broadest age range stipulated by OJJDP, rather than focusing only on those above or below age 15. Both Cleveland and Denver set 14 as their minimum age limit, while Mobile selected from among 13-year- olds. As its maximum age limit, Mobile employed the statutory age of juvenile court jurisdiction, 17. In Denver and Cleveland, 18-year-olds could be admitted if they were 17 at the time of referral. Both Cleveland and Mobile met the nonviolent criterion by excluding offenders with offenses on a proscribed list. In Cleveland, this list included murder, manslaughter, rape and other sex offenses, arson, kidnapping, and corruption of a minor. Mobile excluded these same offenders and also those whose offenses were less serious, i.e., assaults 1 and 2, burglary 1, robbery, and shooting into an occupied building or vehicle. Although Denver did not have a set list of exclusionary violent or sex offenses, in practice their offense criteria were similar to Cleveland's. In Mobile and Denver, the exclusions applied to all offenses on a youth's record; in Cleveland they applied only to current offenses. Cleveland did, however, eliminate youths from consideration if they were considered serious, habitual offenders. None of the three sites set lower boundary offense criteria. In all three sites, however, the expectation was that the programs would not serve youths who were before the court for the first time. In fact, Cleveland's criteria implied that only misdemeanor and felony offenses would be eligible. Mobile targeted youths who had failed on probation and whose probation officer recommended them for the program. Denver targeted youths who were committed to the State Department of Youth Services and were awaiting placement at its classification center. Denver also targeted youths under probation supervision by the local juvenile court. Only Cleveland selected participants entirely from youths who would otherwise have had a residential placement either at a Ohio Division of Youth Services (ODYS) facility or at the county-run Youth Development Center (YDC), neither of which accepts status offenders. Thus, on the selection discussed previously, Mobile's criteria fell closest to the net-widening end, admitting youths who might otherwise receive a probation sentence. Denver's criteria defined a midpoint and included both probationers and youths committed to State custody. Cleveland fell closest to the other end of the spectrum, selecting from among the institution-bound only. The special demands of boot camp dictated stringent medical and psychological screening. All three programs required thorough medical screenings to ensure that youths would be able to participate in rigorous physical conditioning. They also attempted to screen out youths with psychological problems that might reduce their tolerance level for a highly structured military- style setting. Youths with serious drug and alcohol addictions (Cleveland specified only those serious enough to require detoxification) were excluded for similar reasons. Because the boot camps would not be located in high-security facilities, youths who were considered escape risks were ruled out as candidates. Finally, Mobile added an intelligence criterion requiring candidates to have a minimum IQ of 60. Although voluntary participation is typical of many adult boot camps, Cleveland was the only site requiring voluntary agreement. Initially, there was concern in Cleveland that too few youths would volunteer for the program because the alternative at ODYS or YDC would only be a few months longer than the "tough" boot camp. Whereas offenders volunteer for boot camp in the adult system because their prison sentence could be reduced by several years, the attraction is less obvious in the juvenile system, where sentence reduction amounts to no more than a few months. Despite these fears, Cleveland remained committed to voluntary participation, believing it to be a powerful motivational tool. Indeed, the concerns proved fruitless, as almost all of the youths offered an opportunity to enter the candidate pool did, in fact, volunteer. Cleveland's voluntary participation requirement went further than OJJDP's stipulation that youths "show a motivation to participate." Denver took a youth's feelings about boot camp into consideration in selection decisions, but it did not necessarily exclude an unwilling youth from eligibility on that basis. In Mobile, there was no voluntary aspect to the assignment process. In part, this policy stemmed from the fact that judges perceived a voluntary requirement as a limit to their judicial discretion. It also stemmed from concerns--similar to those in Cleveland--that the program would not be able to attract enough volunteers. Selection Process The selection process was tailored to the processes already in place in the three juvenile justice systems. Some features, however, were shared across programs. Each camp entered youths in "platoons" or "flights" of 7 to 13. The capacity at both Cleveland and Mobile allowed 10 to 12 youths to enter the program each month. Denver's capacity was smaller, permitting 12 youths to enter the camp every 6 weeks. Each program followed random assignment procedures, requiring the identification of double the number of youths required for an experimental intervention. In addition, the programs first employed less expensive screening strategies, such as reviews of official records, reserving the more expensive medical exams until the pool of candidates had been winnowed to a more manageable level. Following are summaries of the selection processes used in Cleveland, Denver, and Mobile. Cleveland After a juvenile court judge had committed a youth to ODYS or to YDC, a special boot camp program manager conducted a preliminary screening for age and medical history and obtained a release of information. All youths with ODYS or YDC commitments entered the detention center, regardless of whether they were in secure detention during the pretrial stage. At this juncture the judge could override a youth's entry into the candidate pool and send him directly to ODYS or YDC, or a youth could fall out of the pool because he qualified for community corrections. Next, the program manager reviewed the criminal, social, and medical history of youths remaining in the pool and met with each candidate to explain the boot camp program and to obtain a written voluntary participation statement. The program manager also administered mental health and substance abuse screens. Finally, the physician at the detention center conducted a physical exam. All youths who survived this process were then submitted in pairs to the research team for random assignment. The entire screening process took no more than 2 days. Youths who were assigned to the control conditions were generally transported to one of the nine ODYS institutions or to YDC within a few hours. Boot camp youths were held in the detention center or, in a few cases, released to a shelter care facility to await the assembly of the next platoon of youths at the first of the month. During this time the program manager conducted both a parent and a youth orientation to boot camp. Denver In Denver, there were two tracks for entry into boot camp: the Department of Youth Services (DYS) track, accounting for about 56 percent of the candidate pool, and the probation track, accounting for the remainder. The latter involved a less systematic process. The DYS candidate pool consisted of all youths housed at the DYS selection and classification center at that time. Two DYS case managers assigned to the program screened suitable candidates with the assistance of center staff and DYS field officers. The screeners focused on youths with risk scores that qualified them for a medium security facility or community placement. The routine classification process, which involves medical, clinical, educational, and drug and alcohol evaluations at the center, produced most of the information needed to determine whether a youth qualified for the candidate pool. The manager also met with a parent to obtain additional medical information. Finally, case managers met with youths to orient them to the program and to determine their interest in the program. The case managers made the final decision as to whether the youths entered the boot camp pool, and they presented pairs of youths to the research team for random assignment. The other pool of candidates came from individual probation officers in Denver, who could make referrals to the DYS case managers. Youths could be referred before or after sentencing or when they had violated conditions of their probation. Because youths who entered the pool via probation avenues were not part of the DYS system, the DYS case managers did not have easy access to them or to their records, except for court actions recorded in Colorado's statewide computer system. Case managers collected background data from the probation officers and interviewed most youths over the telephone. Youths were required to have medical screenings. Case managers then made final admission decisions on the basis of this information and relayed pairs of youths for random assignment. For youths who had already been sentenced, the judge generally had paved the way for random assignment by specifying boot camp and an alternative placement. Youths already sentenced or who faced a violation of probation at the time of random assignment had to appear before a judge to finalize the disposition. The distinction between youths who entered the program via probation and those who entered via DYS was maintained in the aftercare period, when DYS youths were supervised by DYS case managers and probation youths were assigned to probation officers. Mobile After adjudication, probation officers screened youths to determine if they met the age and offense criteria specified by the program. They also made recommendations to the court regarding which youths should be considered for admission. After this initial screening, the judge ordered youths into the candidate pool or made an alternative disposition. Youths who entered the pool underwent a series of tests: a suicide risk assessment, an escape risk assessment, a drug and alcohol assessment, a psychological examination, and, if the youths did not have an intelligence score on record, an IQ test. Candidates were required to arrange for a medical exam by their own doctor or were provided a medical examination by a local clinic. Finally, the EYC director reviewed the candidate pool and could override assignment decisions. This final review was subject to an appeal by the probation officer to a committee consisting of the boot camp director, the probation officer, the Strickland Youth Center psychometrist, the boot camp drug and alcohol assessor, a boot camp life skills coordinator, and a probation supervisor. Youths selected for the final pool were submitted in pairs for random assignment. Pretransfer Holding youths in detention or at a central classification center simplified the screening process because youths were more accessible and because information is routinely collected at those detention sites. Of the youths who entered the three boot camps during the first year, at least 74 percent in Denver, and slightly fewer than half in the other two sites, had been placed in secure detention prior to their adjudication. Once selected, however, detention was mandatory in Cleveland. All of the youths were held in secure detention during the period from disposition to transfer, approximately 98 percent of them for the entire time. In both Denver and Mobile the percentages of youths in secure detention during all or part of the selection period were 66 percent and 44 percent, respectively. Although it simplifies the selection process, detaining youths adds to the cost of a program and must be factored into cost-effectiveness equations. Because the programs formed platoons on a monthly basis in both Cleveland and Mobile, and every 6 weeks in Denver, it was expected that at least 1 or 2 weeks would elapse between random assignment and intake into the boot camp. Mobile had the shortest time period between assignment and transfer, with 64 percent of youths waiting no more than 9 days. The abbreviated wait, in conjunction with the low detention rate, meant that the * In Mobile, judges do not sentence youths until after selections have been made for boot camp; it is therefore not known to what option a judge would have sentenced youths admitted to boot camp. ** In Denver, probation may refer youths to the program prior to disposition. Youths then appear for disposition. Those youths assigned to the experimental group would have "boot camp" entered on the record, in essence approving the random assignment. Mobile program involved fewer postcommitment detention days, and, therefore, presumably experienced lower costs than the other two programs. As would be expected with the longer period between formation of platoons, Denver had the longest time periods between disposition and transfer, with almost half of the youths waiting 20 or more days. Cleveland fell in the middle with a median wait of about 2 weeks. In Cleveland, the added time in detention was a problem because of overcrowding in the detention center. Once a youth is committed to ODYS or YDC, he generally is transported immediately, rarely waiting longer than 1 or 2 days. Therefore, a median postcommitment time of 13 days for up to 10 youths each month was an added burden on the detention center. The demonstration program had the opposite effect on Denver's detention situation. According to DYS staff, detained boot camp youths, though spending more days on average in detention than youths at either of the other boot camp programs, were likely still detained a shorter period of time than other committed youths in Denver. In fact, Colorado's youth service system is so crowded, and committed youths there wait so long for residential placements, that the shorter preboot camp detention periods may have been an incentive for youths to seek the boot camp alternative. Characteristics of Youths Screened into Boot Camp The programs began selecting youths to participate in boot camp in March 1992, and the first cohort entered facilities in April. During the first year of operation, Cleveland accepted 119 youths, Denver accepted 76, and Mobile accepted 122. The social, educational, and delinquent characteristics of these youths are presented below. The programs' screening criteria yielded an all- male population of predominantly older youths. Over three-quarters of the youths in both Cleveland and Denver were at least 16 years old. Mobile drew a slightly younger recruit class, with an average age of 15.6, compared to 16.5 in both Cleveland and Denver. Mobile was the only program to accept 13-year-olds, and it selected 7 percent of its recruits from this group. Denver set a screening minimum of age 14, but in practice screened out most 14-year-olds because staff believed that programming was not appropriate for such a broad age range (14- to 18-year-olds). About 80 percent of recruits in Cleveland and 64 percent of recruits in Mobile were African American. Except for a few Hispanic youths in Cleveland, the remainder of recruits in both programs were white. Denver's boot camp population was more varied, with 35 percent African American, 35 percent white, 22 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent Native American and other. Criminal Records. Consistent with the program's target criteria, most boot camp youths were not violent or serious, habitual offenders. However, screening rules did vary across sites. Cleveland selected the most serious group of offenders, Mobile selected the least serious group, and Denver fell in the middle. Felony referrals predominate at all three sites, with 72.3 percent of youth in Cleveland, 50.7 in Denver, and 49.2 percent in Mobile entering boot camp on felony charges. These typically were property offenses in Denver and Mobile and, to a lesser extent, in Cleveland. Cleveland differed from the other two sites in that a number of youths entered the program on drug felonies and on felonies against persons. All three programs took in a substantial proportion of probation violators, with no additional offense adjudicated concurrently. About 23 percent of youths in Cleveland, 29 percent in Denver, and 38 percent in Mobile were selected for boot camp on the basis of probation violations. Although the majority of the offenses in all three programs were property crimes, the type of crime differed across the three sites. More than a quarter of instant offenses in Mobile were thefts, but in the other sites thefts represented much smaller proportions. On the other hand, Mobile had fewer auto thefts than Denver or Cleveland. (It is not known how many auto thefts were reported in Cleveland because this offense is charged there as "receiving stolen property" and categorized as "other property.") Cleveland had the highest percentage of youths brought in on robberies (13 percent) and also had a substantial number of drug offenses, the bulk of which were drug trafficking rather than possession or use. The vast majority of instant offenses in Cleveland and Mobile were felonies, accounting for 93.5 percent and 78.9 percent, respectively, of cases reported at those sites. Denver had a much higher percentage of youths brought in on misdemeanor charges (37.7 percent). Three additional indicators of the seriousness of boot camp participants' instant offenses are the degree of injury to the victim, the amount of loss associated with the offense, and whether a gun was involved. As would be expected from the program criteria, most instant offenses did not involve physical injury to the victim. Victims in a few cases required treatment by a doctor or hospitalization, but for the most part injuries were minor. About 15 percent of cases in Cleveland involved use of a gun, however, compared with 7 percent in Denver and Mobile. Property damage or loss was prevalent in Mobile and Denver, where over half of the offenses involved some losses. A relatively small proportion of cases (26.3 percent in Denver, 19.7 percent in Mobile, and 9.9 percent in Cleveland) involved losses of $600 or more. Prior to their instant offense, most boot camp youths had accumulated a delinquency record and were under supervision by the juvenile court. Because Mobile intentionally selected youths who had violated probation, it is not surprising that 73.8 percent of the program's recruits were on probation or parole upon arrest for the boot camp offense. A similar proportion of youths in Cleveland and a slightly lower percentage of youths in Denver were on probation or parole. Youths in the "other" status category had escaped from an institution or otherwise were under some form of court supervision. Only 16.9 percent of the boot camp youths in Cleveland, 9.3 percent in Denver, and 10.7 percent in Mobile were not involved in the juvenile system when they were arrested for their current offense. With respect to prior findings, Cleveland's youths had accumulated the most extensive delinquency records by the time they committed their instant offenses. About 19 percent of the Cleveland youths had three or more felony findings excluding the instant offense and 41 percent of them had two or more felony findings. In Denver and Mobile only about 20 percent of the youths had two or more prior felony findings. Only 24 percent of the Cleveland youths had no prior felony finding before the offense which stimulated program entry, in contrast to 49 percent of the Denver youths and 43 percent of the Mobile youths. Looking at their entire criminal histories at the point of boot camp entry, the differences between youths in Cleveland and those in the other two programs are even more apparent. Ninety-seven percent of Cleveland youths had at least one felony charge on their records. The mean number of felony charges on their records was 3.0, dropping only slightly, to 2.8, for mean felony findings. Denver and Mobile's youths had on average at least one fewer felony finding and fewer felony charges. About 24 percent of youths in Denver and 21 percent in Mobile did not have any felony charges but all youths in Cleveland and all but one in Denver had at least one felony or misdemeanor charge upon entry to boot camp. In Mobile, however, 10 youths whose only delinquent offense was a violation of a court order for a status offense entered the program. On average, youths in Denver initiated their criminal careers at later ages than youths in Mobile and Cleveland. The mean age of first criminal referral ranged from 13.7 years in Mobile to 14.9 years in Denver. These differences may be more apparent than real, however. In Denver, many youths had prior run-ins with Colorado's municipal courts, which handle violations and some misdemeanors. The official State delinquency records for these youths commenced when they contacted a county-level court. The researchers did not have systematic access to municipal court information. Not only had youths in Cleveland accumulated more serious criminal records than youths in Mobile and Denver, but 27 percent had a prior commitment to either the State or county correctional system. Fewer than 5 percent of youths in either Mobile or Denver had State commitments, but both programs had youths who had been confined for less restrictive sentences. In Denver, 45 percent had received a "probation plus detention" sentence prior to boot camp, and in Mobile, 16 percent had served time in Camp Basic, a 2-week precursor to the boot camp program. Only about 16 percent of youths in Mobile and Cleveland and 26 percent in Denver had not received at least a formal probation sentence prior to boot camp. In summary, most youths selected for boot camp had a prior sentence at least as serious as probation, and they were either on probation/parole or had some other system involvement prior to their entry into boot camp. The instant offense was typically a property, drug, or "other" felony involving no injury and relatively small monetary loss. Some youths entered boot camp on a violation of a court order or probation with no other new offense; all of the youths entering on violations had prior criminal offenses, except for 10 youths in Mobile who had been placed on probation for status offenses. According to any of the criteria discussed, recruits in Cleveland had considerably more serious criminal records than youths in either Mobile or Denver. Family and Social Characteristics. The characteristics of the boot camp youths' families reveal a disturbing picture of youths living in broken families that in many cases were already known to the court system. At the time of referral to boot camp, no more than 30 percent of youths in the three programs lived with both parents or a parent and a stepparent. In the two sites where data was available--Cleveland and Mobile--58 percent and 46 percent, respectively, of participants' families were on some form of public assistance. About one-third or more of youths in all three programs had one or more siblings with official delinquency records, and sizeable proportions of the youths' parents were known to have either criminal records or to have been referred for child neglect and abuse. The numbers are slightly lower in Denver, and lower still in Mobile, but Cleveland made a point of collecting this information for use in assessing their candidates' risk, while the other sites did not. The main point is that many of these youths came from families already ensconced in the criminal justice system. Reviews of youths' social background records show that most boot camp youths hang out with peers who also are delinquent. Almost all youths in Cleveland and Mobile and about 78 percent in Denver reported having delinquent friends. Discipline problems at home or at school also were prevalent among these youths, particularly in Cleveland and Denver. Almost half of the youths in Denver had "major" drug or alcohol use problems. Major drug problems were reported less frequently for youths in Cleveland and Mobile, possibly because more youths with such problems were screened out. Gang problems surfaced most frequently among youths in Denver, with 42 percent suspected of major gang involvement. About 30 percent of youths in Cleveland and 26 percent in Mobile had strong gang links. At the point of boot camp entry, the vast majority of youths in Cleveland and Denver were either not enrolled in school or were enrolled but attending very sporadically. Proportionately fewer of the youths in Mobile exhibited school dropout or severe attendance patterns, perhaps because they were somewhat younger. In addition to data from social records, in Cleveland self-report data were available from a youth survey administered at the detention center before selection for the program. Because these surveys were administered by a boot camp staff member at a time when the youths may have been trying to cast themselves in the best light possible to gain entry into the boot camp program, limited significance can be given to the results. However, the surveys do provide some insight into how the youths perceived themselves, or how they may have wanted to portray themselves. Many survey items asked youths to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statements on a 5- point Likert scale. More than 50 percent of the youths reported a "positive attitude" toward themselves on four of the five statements. However, fewer than half were satisfied with themselves. A number of youths reported difficulty controlling their tempers and saying things without stopping to think. On the other hand, 92 percent responded in the direction indicating internal locus of control by agreeing that a person can pretty well make whatever he wants out of his life. Most youths perceived that they had some control over their destiny. Responses to the statements concerning peer relationships were generally positive. Youths generally felt close to their friends and believed they fit in well with them. They also agreed that it is easy to have friends if you try to be friendly. Boot camp youths also perceived that their peers generally disapprove of criminal behavior, particularly if it involves breaking into a building or using force. However, fewer than half reported that their friends would disapprove of their hitting or threatening someone or of their selling hard drugs. A percentage of youths reported that they had engaged in various delinquent and other negative behaviors in the 3 months prior to boot camp admission. Generally, the more serious the crime, the fewer the number of youth admitting having committed it. More than half the youths reported that they had been rowdy in a public place, hit or threatened to hit other students in the last 3 months, or taken part in a fight where a group of their friends were pitted against another group. On the other hand, none reported that he had raped someone, and few reported using force to rob students or adults. An interesting finding from the survey was the frequency of reported sexual activity. All but 5 percent of the youths reported having had sex in the 3 months prior to admittance to the camps, and 45 percent reported having had sex on 10 or more occasions. The majority reported using alcohol, and about 38 percent reported using marijuana. None of the youths reported using drugs such as crack, cocaine, or heroin. Taken at face value, the surveys described a pool of youths with fairly good self-esteem and strong peer relationships, most of whom did not admit to criminal activity of a serious nature during the 3 months prior to detention. However, a number of the youths did admit to minor criminal behavior and fighting among peers, as well as alcohol use. The vast majority also claimed frequent sexual activity. Problems In the Selection Process Three types of selection problems emerged as the programs implemented their designs: screening procedures inadequate to detect all medical, behavioral, and psychological problems; uncertainty about the appropriateness of the screening criteria, particularly with regard to age and criminal history; and problems attaining adequate cohort sizes. (A fourth problem, deviations from random assignment, is described in Appendix A.) Inability of Screening Procedures To Detect Problems Soon after program implementation, some flaws in the screening process became apparent. Almost immediately, program staff found that some medical problems had eluded detection in the screening stage. This problem caused concern not only because physical training was an integral part of the program, but also because the program could potentially be held liable in the case of injury. In Cleveland, the program supplemented the detention physical with a more thorough physical by the physician at the Youth Development Center. In Denver, case managers attempted to supplement medical information on participants' health problems with medical histories obtained from parents. Behavioral problems that did not respond to the boot camp environment also became apparent fairly early in the program. In response, the programs tightened screening by reviewing the characteristics of some of the early program failures and alerting the screeners to those problems. Mobile took a second look at its screen for psychosis after some particularly bizarre animalistic behavior on the part of one youth. Uncertainty About the Appropriateness of the Screening Criteria Both Cleveland and Denver expressed some dissatisfaction with the blanket exclusion of youths who had committed "violent" crimes, and no site adhered to this requirement 100 percent. In Denver, staff observed that most youths in the juvenile system had some history of violence, in part because gang involvement was so prevalent, even though this violent experience might not appear on their official records. In any case, staff felt that youths presumed to have a violent history did no worse than others in boot camp, and some performed extremely well. Denver did not relax the criterion until the end of the second year, and then only occasionally. In actuality, however, the programs included offenders with violent instant offenses, including youths who had committed aggravated assaults or robberies. Fifteen percent of the instant offenses in Cleveland included use of a gun. Cleveland took youths who had committed violent offenses as long as those offenses were not their instant offense. Another area of uncertainty was deciding what ages were appropriate for the programs. As noted above, none of the programs elected to serve a more narrow age population as suggested by OJJDP, but chose instead to serve all juveniles ages 13 to 17 (in Mobile) or 14 to 17 (in Cleveland and Denver). Denver, after a couple of months of experience, avoided 14-year-olds and instead sought older youths believed to be more socially mature. On the other hand, older youths were a problem because many of them were inappropriate for regular school placements, and because aftercare programs had been designed with the assumption that youths would be supervised at school during the day. All three programs had a number of 18-year-old youths in boot camp who turned 18 after the offense was filed (date age calculated for screening purposes), but before transport to boot camp. Problems Attaining Adequate Caseload Sizes Except for some initial tinkering with the timing of selection for a new cohort, neither Cleveland nor Mobile had any major difficulties obtaining enough cases, even though the research design required them to identify two youths for every program slot. It is notable that in Cleveland participation was adequate despite the fact that the youths had to volunteer for the program. In Denver, however, the program was plagued by a lack of participants, and it never reached capacity. Certainly the random assignment procedures exacerbated this problem. Overall, except for the random assignment requirements, the programs appeared satisfied with the selection criteria and process. Although Denver and Cleveland believed they could handle youthful violent offenders in their programs, staff admitted that it was difficult to predict which types of youth would succeed or fail in the boot camp environment. Chapter 5 attempts to answer that question empirically. Chapter 4. Boot Camp: The Intensive Training Phase A 90-day period of residence in a boot camp, known as the "intensive training phase," was the heart of the demonstration program. In this chapter, the key features of the boot camp phase are described. Unless otherwise noted, descriptions are based on the first year of boot camp operations, from April 1992 through March 1993. Boot Camp Philosophy and Design According to OJJDP's program announcement, the intensive training phase was expected to offer a crime- and drug-free environment in which to change the behavior and attitudes of participants. To achieve these changes, the program would expose youths to military-like routine, drills and discipline, and rigorous physical conditioning. The program would also include rehabilitative components such as education, counseling, development of work- and life-coping skills, drug and alcohol abuse programming, and family involvement. Upon graduation from boot camp, each youth would return to the community with an individualized plan for continuing and reinforcing the progress he had made (Federal Register, 1990). Although OJJDP dictated the framework for the boot camp phase, it was up to the demonstration sites to flesh out a program that incorporated the required elements, was philosophically coherent, and was appropriate for juveniles. Much of the initial framework was completed during the proposal development stage. Because none of the grantees had previous experience with boot camp programs for juveniles or adults, all looked closely at the available literature and visited at least one boot camp for adults. The grantees also struggled to translate the broad vision of a "character-building" program into a plan for day- to-day operations. As a result, each boot camp developed a rationale and perspective that was distinctive. o Cleveland's program designers at juvenile court steered away from what they perceived to be the negative, degrading, and excessively punitive aspects of some boot camps. Instead, they elected the treatment approach, augmented by an atmosphere of military discipline, that the North American Family Institute (NAFI) had implemented in other locations. NAFI's approach, based on the "normative model," assumes that individuals assimilate group norms in order to belong. Because delinquents have gravitated toward antisocial normative systems, treatment must move them back toward healthy, prosocial values and functioning. NAFI aims to create a safe, comfortable environment in which staff can set clear expectations, establish a positive peer culture, and persuade youths to accept different values and behaviors. A counseling technique called guided group interaction is a crucial part of the NAFI approach. For Cleveland's program, NAFI would incorporate only those aspects of military boot camps compatible with the normative model. In general, this meant regimentation and structure, physical exercise, and military customs and courtesies--elements that would create a safe, secure environment for participants. o The Denver grantees, the Colorado Division of Youth Services and New Pride, Inc., had lengthy experience in providing a wide variety of programs for delinquent juveniles in residential and nonresidential settings. They saw the boot camp phase as a chance to depart radically from previous treatment models--that is, to commit fully to the military model. Although their boot camp would include some traditional rehabilitative programming, that would not be its primary emphasis. Thus, the staff would deliberately try to make boot camp a high-stress experience in which profound life changes could take root. Drill instructors (DI's) would be expected to play the "tough" role, unlike counselors that youths might encounter in other types of programs. Strict military-style discipline would teach socially acceptable behavior and the consequences of deviance. Meanwhile, DI's would provide the positive role models of leadership and integrity that many youths were lacking. Ultimately, as in Cleveland, the hope was that youths would come to identify and internalize these positive standards of conduct. Program staff also felt that the toughness of the program would provide another benefit: Unlike the usual DYS parolee, a youth who graduated from boot camp would have an accomplishment to be proud of. In short, Denver's boot camp would equip its graduates with the self- esteem, self-discipline, and positive values to profit from the educational and treatment programs available during aftercare. o In Mobile, the military model was familiar and readily acceptable to program planners and the wider community. As home to a number of military bases and to many military careerists, veterans, and retirees, Alabama is generally sympathetic to program models that stress discipline and regimentation and uphold traditional values. Mobile, in addition, had experimented with a 2- week boot camp prior to receiving the OJJDP demonstration grant. The driving concept behind Mobile's demonstration program was that unfocused and inattentive youths cannot benefit from rehabilitative and treatment regimens. The military model was viewed as an effective means to gain the attention of participants and get them to focus on specific activities and aims. In time, disciplined behavior and exposure to DI role models would improve self-discipline and the ability to concentrate. Youths then would be ready to respond to individualized education, challenging activities requiring teamwork, and counseling. Moreover, part of the boot camp experience would include an opportunity to learn respect for the environment and take part in outdoor activities to help maintain it--an emphasis giving rise to the program's name, the Environmental Youth Corps. In all three programs, these basic orientations remained constant throughout the demonstration and accounted for some differences in program emphasis. As discussed below, despite differences in emphasis, the boot camps shared many features. In chapter 5, the authors illustrate how there was much more cross-site variation in aftercare. Program Capacity and Utilization Program capacity, which ranged from 24 participants in Denver to 30 in Cleveland and 52 in Mobile, was dictated mainly by the amount of the OJJDP award and the size of the building(s) available to the boot camps. The boot camps were designed to admit "platoons"-- groups of youths who would enter boot camp together and graduate together. To fully use its facility capacity, Cleveland intended to start a new platoon of 10 youths every month. Similarly, Denver planned on a platoon of 12 every 6 weeks, and Mobile planned on a platoon of 13 every 3 weeks. Although Cleveland was generally able to meet its targets, platoons in Denver and Mobile were smaller than expected, averaging 10 participants each. Also, the period between platoons in Denver and Mobile was, on average, 7 to 10 days longer than expected. In any case, the Mobile facility would have been extremely cramped if it had admitted platoons according to the original plan. In fact, during the second year of Mobile's program, official capacity was limited to 32 by order of the fire marshal. All three programs accepted their initial cohort in early to mid-April 1992, about 6 months after the OJJDP award. Cleveland and Mobile admitted 12 platoons during the first full year, and Denver took in eight. Facilities All three programs modified existing facilities to serve as boot camps. The Cleveland program, called Camp Roulston, used two cottages at a county- operated residential center for delinquents, situated about 30 miles outside the city. Denver's Camp Foxfire occupied a building on the grounds of a DYS youth services center on the outskirts of Denver. The Mobile program used a separate building and two trailers at the county court's Strickland Youth Center. Although each program had its own building or buildings, the location enabled the demonstration programs to share some facilities and services with other programs, such as classrooms in Cleveland and medical services, cafeteria services, and recreational areas at all three sites. Through constant supervision and careful scheduling, the programs avoided commingling boot camp participants with youths in other programs. At times, however, boot camp participants were within sight and sound of others. Staff reported that participants occasionally were taunted by youths from other programs, but generally this kind of harassment was minor. In fact, in Cleveland, youths from other programs looked favorably upon boot camp and even requested that some of its procedures be adapted for them. Similarly, in Denver, after adjacent youths had complained that the boot camp's early morning exercise drills were waking them up, the camp director noticed that some of these youths had begun running in the morning. The boot camps depended on staff supervision, rather than fences, for security. There were no fences in Cleveland, and in Denver and Mobile, portions of the boot camp grounds were fenced but program activities were conducted beyond those boundaries. Management and Staffing At each site, the boot camp was operated by the private nongovernmental partner in the demonstration. This was the North American Family Institute (NAFI) in Cleveland, New Pride, Inc., in Denver, and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile in Mobile. The Cleveland boot camp was staffed entirely by NAFI employees. Although private employees predominated at both the Denver and Mobile boot camps, these camps also included staff employed by their public agency partners, the Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS) and the County Court, respectively. The staffing level at each site included not only personnel who were stationed at the boot camp and had day-to-day responsibility for the program there; each boot camp received additional administrative and management support, as well as assistance with diagnostic assessments, from the agencies participating in the demonstration. Cleveland had the most generous staffing support, with 22 staff members for the intensive training phase, including three teachers who were provided under subcontract. This level of staffing amounted to one staff person for every 1.4 beds. Denver had 12 staff and Mobile had 21, translating into one staff member for every two beds in Denver and one for every 2.4 beds in Mobile. In all three boot camps, drill instructors (DI's) made up the majority of the staff, and it was in this position that differences in staffing across sites were most apparent. Cleveland had more DI's than Mobile and Denver put together. The latter sites used security guards to supplement or replace the DI force after lights out, while Cleveland used part-time DI's to relieve full- timers when necessary. As a result, Denver normally assigned only one DI to each of the day shifts. At night, one DI slept in the facility while a security guard kept watch. Mobile averaged three DI's per day shift and two DI's or security guards at night. Cleveland normally had five DI's on the day shifts and four at night. In contrast to Cleveland, both Denver and Mobile struggled to cover all shifts while allowing sufficient sick leave and vacation time for DI's. The need to take pressure off the DI staff was one reason why these two sites sometimes stretched out the interval between new platoons. (Inability to find sufficient qualified applicants was another reason, especially in Denver.) As a result of the slower than intended pace of intake in Denver and Mobile, as well as early terminations from all three programs, facilities were never filled to capacity. As a result, ratios of participants to total staff were variable and consistently lower than ratios of beds to staff. Staffing levels for positions other than drill instructors were more consistent across sites. Mobile had two to three client managers and Denver had two, compared to Cleveland's one. However, the functions of Cleveland's client manager were narrower. Called a human resources manager, he was primarily responsible for youths currently in the camp and was employed by NAFI. In contrast, client managers in both Denver and Mobile had broader functions and were government employees. In Denver, the client managers worked for DYS and had responsibility for screening boot camp candidates and managing boot camp graduates, as well as working with current boot camp residents. Mobile's client managers, who were county probation officers, had similar responsibilities for youths in and out of the camp. At all three sites, the client managers were assigned exclusively to the demonstration programs. Consistent with a strong emphasis on educational progress during boot camp, Mobile employed four educational staff to deliver academic and life skills curriculums, in contrast to Denver's two. Cleveland contracted with an alternative school, obtaining three teachers for its education program. This circumvented the need to hire teachers directly, an action which had threatened to antagonize the local teacher's union. Overall supervision of each boot camp was provided by an onsite director, employed by the private partner in the demonstration. In Denver and Mobile, the director did not supervise the client managers at boot camp because they were government employees and under the supervision of their respective agencies. The Denver director's duties were limited to the boot camp, but directors in Mobile and Cleveland had broader responsibilities. Mobile's director was also responsible for supervising the demonstration's aftercare coordinator. In Cleveland, responsibility for directing boot camp and aftercare was combined in a single position, with the director maintaining offices at both the boot camp and aftercare locations. Cleveland had begun operations with separate directors for boot camp and aftercare but combined these functions within a few months under a central director to provide more continuity of programming. DI Qualifications and Training At all three sites, the positions of drill instructor and camp director were new to the juvenile correctional system. Each site wanted DI's who were able to relate to youths, but in other respects they took differing approaches. Cleveland deliberately chose a mix of staff representing both military and counseling backgrounds "to provide checks and balances." Whatever their backgrounds, staff had to be flexible enough to adapt to the broader program demands. Denver and Mobile, on the other hand, specifically chose people with military experience. (Only one DI in Denver did not have a military or ROTC background.) They wanted people who could "play the role" of a DI, offering a model of good physical condition and consistent, fair leadership. In fact, Denver specifically avoided hiring DI's with counseling or therapeutic backgrounds for fear that they would have difficulty adhering to the military model. The camp commander in Denver was ex-military and also had law enforcement experience. In Cleveland, neither of the first two directors had military experience. One had a background in child care and the other had a background in corrections. The third director had served in the military, but his primary work experience was in corrections. In Mobile, the initial director was retired military with experience in adult correctional boot camps. The second director was a social scientist and evaluation specialist, and the third director was retired military with expertise in basic skills education. Each site took a distinctive approach to training its boot camp team. In Cleveland, the original staff received several days of training from NAFI before the boot camp opened. NAFI also offered 8 hours per month of inservice training, and senior staff received additional training at NAFI headquarters in Massachusetts. Replacement staff received a 3-day orientation at another NAFI facility, as well as onsite orientation and one- on-one monitoring and support. Denver sent its commander and initial DI team for a 3-week stint at Quantico, Virginia, where they attended Marine DI training specially designed for correctional officers. This session was supplemented by some local training on the juvenile justice system. One DI was trained on the job, having come on board after the initial training. Mobile's initial team underwent 3 weeks of intensive, onsite training designed by the camp director. Subsequent hires were trained on the job. Staff Turnover Staff turnover at the three boot camps varied dramatically. During the first full year of boot camp operations, the period in which systematic data were collected for participating youths, both Cleveland and Mobile changed boot camp directors. In Cleveland, the change resulted from philosophical differences between NAFI and the original director. In Mobile, local policymakers were unhappy with what they saw as an overly militaristic approach by the first director. He was replaced by a social scientist from the University of South Alabama who had been involved in designing the original program. Cleveland and Mobile also experienced relatively high turnover in other positions. Some staff were dismissed for disobeying program rules. Others quit, often for better pay. In Mobile, some DI's also left because they were unhappy with the change of directors, and two other staff were laid off because of downsizing necessitated by a pared- down continuation award from OJJDP. One of Mobile's DI's was let go after a child molestation charge came to light; although the charge had nothing to do with his boot camp performance, it would have disqualified him for hiring if known at the time of his job application. By the end of the first year at Mobile's boot camp, only three of the nine original DI's and one of the five original teachers remained. In contrast, Denver's turnover was low in both the first and second years of operations. The original camp director remained with the boot camp for the first 18 months, with the senior drill instructor stepping in for the final 6 months. Otherwise, the program lost just two staff. In the first year a DI was fired for not adhering to the program's disciplinary guidelines, and in the second year one teacher was terminated as a result of cuts in OJJDP funding. Denver staff attribute the low turnover among DI's in part to competitive salaries and a tight job market resulting from the closing of a local military base. Program Content During Boot Camp All three boot camps provided recruits a mixture of regimentation and discipline plus rehabilitative programming in a spartan environment. Physical Environment Mobile housed its recruits in barracks with bunk beds, and Denver assigned its junior, or newest, platoon to beds in the day room. All youths in Cleveland's camp had individual rooms, as did members of Denver's senior platoon. Despite the differences in sleeping arrangements, boot camp settings were spartan at all locations. Facilities contained limited, extremely functional furniture, and sleeping rooms were devoid of personal touches. Youths stored uniforms and their few belongings in foot lockers or a single bureau. Televisions and radios were generally off limits, unless granted as a special privilege. Visiting privileges were strictly limited, and home visits were not allowed. Telephone access also was severely restricted. Even at the site with the most generous telephone policy, youths could call home only once a week. Military Regimentation and Discipline Following through on the military theme, all programs accorded a central role to the drill instructor. Drill instructors were the primary supervisors of boot camp participants and were responsible for keeping them on a demanding, tightly controlled schedule that provided little or no personal time. Drill instructors used military titles (e.g., sergeant, lieutenant), and DI's and youths wore military-style uniforms. Platoons earned hats or special insignia to differentiate their rank in the program. DI's also trained youths to use military customs and courtesies ("Yes, Sir," "Recruit Jones requests permission to...," etc.), accustomed them to standing at attention, and taught them to march in drill formation. There were routine inspections of living quarters and personal hygiene, and mail was monitored. In addition to enforcing discipline, these techniques served to prevent contraband from getting into the facilities and to discourage gang insignia, such as self-administered tattoos. All programs were harshest or most restrictive in the first days and weeks while military rules and protocol were being learned. Programs were split into three 30-day periods, with attainment of the next phase signified by a change in shirt color or hat, as well as increased privileges. Participants could earn the right to visitation or phone calls, for example. Senior recruits were expected to be models for newer recruits. Like their military counterparts, these boot camps ended with a public graduation ceremony attended by parents and friends of the participants as well as local dignitaries, including judges, the local chief of police, and others. Typically, the ceremonies featured marching drills and accorded some special recognition to superior performers. A youth might serve as platoon leader or flag- bearer, for example, or make a brief speech. Despite these similarities, there were variations in the way the military model was implemented at the three sites. Verbal intimidation and yelling were a standard part of the DI style in Denver and Mobile. In fact, both Denver and Mobile used a high-confrontation intake ritual, complete with military haircuts, to establish control initially. Cleveland's intake was briefer and involved less verbal intimidation, and staff there did not yell or use "in-your-face" techniques. In contrast to Denver and Mobile, Cleveland also lacked a "brig" or isolation room for miscreants and placed less emphasis on drilling. Although none of the programs reproduced the rigors and regimentation of a real military boot camp, the Denver camp came closest. Cleveland fell at the other extreme, with Mobile in the middle. In effect, Cleveland, the site that selected the youths with the most serious records, also had the least rigorous boot camp. Mobile and Denver, on the other hand, selected less serious youths and employed more military emphasis. Emulating military models, all three boot camps required youths to routinely maintain their living areas. This requirement included cleaning and polishing private rooms and common spaces and yard work. In Mobile, some cleaning tasks, such as cleaning the administration or classroom buildings, were treated as a privilege because they involved little supervision. Generally, the boot camp staff saw these work activities as one method of teaching good work habits and daily living skills. Extra work also was used as a punishment at all sites. In any event, the result was that the camps looked extremely clean and orderly. Physical Training Physical fitness and conditioning activities were a daily part of the program at all sites. Youths participated in early morning runs and calisthenics, as well as team sports such as football or basketball. Over time, Mobile shifted from individual conditioning toward more group sports. Both Cleveland and Denver made it a practice to test the fitness levels of new platoons in order to establish benchmarks and to protect against injuries from too intense conditioning. Because of concern about the wide variations in fitness levels, Cleveland did not perform this test until the 1-month mark, and Denver limited the running test to one mile. Challenge or Adventure Programming "Challenge" or "adventure" programs typically involve a series of stressful, physically demanding tasks that require group cooperation and problem solving. The tasks are of graduated difficulty and are carried out under the supervision of specially trained staff. All three sites originally proposed to make this type of programming an integral part of the boot camp experience. The reality was somewhat different. Cleveland and Mobile purchased ROPES courses, which included a standard curriculum, one or more obstacle courses, and instructor training. In Cleveland, construction of the courses was delayed as staff attempted to resolve issues of location with the host facility and to obtain construction funds. An indoor course was ready by the second quarter, but an outdoor course was not available until the second year. Challenge activities mainly took place on weekends. In Mobile, challenge and adventure programming, including outings like overnight camping and canoeing, were intended to be a weekly part of the program. Although the program did purchase the ROPES course and some mountain bikes for use on trails at a Boys and Girls Clubs' campground, these activities were not regularly scheduled. A serious problem, not encountered in Cleveland, was staff turnover among the DI's who had been certified as ROPES trainers. With only one ROPES- certified instructor left, use of Mobile's course eventually dwindled to just 10 days out of the boot camp's 90-day period. Denver never implemented a formal challenge program, but the boot camp did construct and use a military-style obstacle course as part of its physical conditioning activities. Education Each boot camp provided several hours of educational programming on weekdays in compliance with State regulations as well as OJJDP guidelines. The typical youth entered boot camp with a record of school failure; many were far behind grade level and some had already dropped out of school. Thus, all the programs emphasized basic skills and remedial education in reading, writing, and mathematics. The specific arrangements for providing the education program varied. After a few months of using teachers hired part time from the host institution, Cleveland subcontracted with an alternative school to run the educational portion of its program. This arrangement was intended to provide a certified program, while freeing the boot camp of the union strictures that would arise from hiring teachers directly. The Denver and Mobile programs hired their own instructors. Mobile's instructors used a packaged curriculum known as the PACE Learning System, which tests a youth's educational level upon intake and then provides an individualized self- paced program of instruction geared to that level. Teachers worked with students individually as they progressed through the curriculum. Although Cleveland's and Denver's programs did not use self-paced instruction, their instructors gave a good deal of individual attention to students because of the great variation in academic skills. Life Skills In addition to basic education, each boot camp offered a "life skills" curriculum, which might be best described as a hybrid of education and group counseling. Life skills curriculum modules varied somewhat but typically incorporated such topics as drugs and alcohol, AIDS, sexual behavior, risk taking, conflict resolution, values clarification, responsible decisionmaking, and goal setting. The curriculums combined techniques like classroom discussion, self-assessments, group exercises, and written assignments. Cleveland's life skills curriculum, designed by the program director, was delivered by the drill instructors. In Denver and Mobile, instructors were hired to deliver the life skills curriculum. The Denver instructor was one of the boot camp's two certified teachers; because of budget cuts, however, she was laid off at the end of the first year, leaving the remaining teacher to cover both academic and life skills instruction. In Mobile, the life skills teacher (there were several over the course of the program) typically brought some experience in counseling and criminal justice. Mobile had originally planned to integrate the life skills and ROPES curriculums under a single instructor. This arrangement never worked out, however, in part because of personnel problems related to finding and retaining a person with the right combination of skills, and in part because of scheduling difficulties. At a more fundamental level, each camp's entire regimen was designed to improve basic life skills such as grooming and personal hygiene, maintenance of surroundings, comportment, and time management through daily instruction and practice. Substance Abuse Education and Counseling All programs tried to avoid admitting youths in need of drug treatment, although many youths were assumed to be drug-involved at some level. As reported in chapter 3, background records of the youths admitted to boot camp often indicated a problem with drugs or alcohol, especially in Cleveland and Denver. As a result, although none of the boot camps provided a separate and distinct substance abuse education or counseling program, all incorporated relevant materials in their life skills curriculum. In Cleveland, some drug counseling also occurred in the context of its guided group interaction program, described below. Other Counseling or Therapy To some extent, staff in all three camps considered every component of their programs to be a form of counseling. However, only Cleveland offered a formal counseling program beyond what was embedded in the life skills or ROPES curriculums. A major focus of Cleveland's program was guided group interaction, a counseling approach designed to foster a positive peer culture. One-hour sessions led by trained drill instructors were held daily. Following explicit written rules of interaction, youths discussed feelings and problem behaviors and attempted to develop acceptable responses. In addition, DI's, probation officers, client managers, or other staff at each site counseled participants informally from time to time on specific behavior problems or a particular issue that was troubling a youth. Family Involvement In contrast to standard practices at many juvenile institutions, family participation and visitation was not encouraged during the program's boot camp phase. The camps generally permitted family visits only in the latter half of the program, and even then visits were severely limited. In Denver, for instance, parents typically visited just once before graduation. However, parents could call case managers for information about their sons, and case managers consulted them during planning for their sons' release from boot camp. Cleveland also held a formal orientation session for each family as youths entered the camp to establish a relationship with the parents and to inform them about the program. Mobile was unique in that it offered an 8-week parenting class at the boot camp, conducted by the program's senior probation officer. Participation was not required, but a major incentive for parents to attend the class was the opportunity to see, but not speak to, their children. DI's marched the platoons through the classroom at some point during each session. Community Service OJJDP did not require that the intensive training phase include community service, but both Mobile and Cleveland did so anyway. In keeping with the program's name, the Environmental Youth Corps, Mobile's youths participated in park, schoolyard, and beach cleanups. Some of Mobile's work activities, such as helping to build the bike trail at the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile's camp, also had a community service element that served the broader community. Cleveland incorporated at least two community service activities during boot camp, including landscaping work and helping to bag food for the homeless. Denver did not include community service among its boot camp activities. Case Management Each boot camp had client managers--a NAFI social worker in Cleveland, two DYS client managers in Denver, and two to three county probation officers in Mobile. In each case, the client manager was responsible for assessing each youth's needs, preparing a workplan for each youth at intake, updating the plan according to his progress and experiences during the boot camp phase, and arranging for his transition to the community. The workplans were designed to be relatively uniform for all participants, but they needed to be much more individualized for the postrelease phase. Some youths might not be able to return to their own homes, for example, and others might require continuing drug counseling. Also, educational goals might vary at this point. Whether the boot camp case manager's responsibility ended at graduation depended on the site. In Mobile, it did not; the probation officers continued as case managers during aftercare. In Cleveland, responsibility shifted to an aftercare case manager. In Denver, the situation depended on the youth's legal status. Case managers retained responsibility for youths who had been committed to DYS but relinquished it to probation officers for youths referred to the program by the juvenile court. Program Duration All three boot camps were designed to last about 90 days. During the first year, the average graduate in Cleveland spent 92 days in boot camp, and in Denver the average stay was 91 days. Time to graduation in Mobile was longer--108 days on average--primarily because the program often held youths back for disciplinary infractions or unsatisfactory progress. However, youths whose performance was exemplary would finish the program in around 90 days. Denver did not use "setbacks"; instead, in rare instances expelled youths were permitted to repeat the entire boot camp program. In exceptional cases, youths also might remain over 90 days in boot camp because case managers needed extra time to find them a place to live in the community. In Denver, this process never involved more than a few days, but in Mobile, at least one youth remained in boot camp for months beyond his scheduled release date because a community placement could not be found. Programming Mix Time was allocated among the main activities at the three camps. Official schedules, which were not always strictly followed and tended to differ at different stages in the programs. Also, program schedules from the three sites did not always use the same terminology or method of breaking down activities. All three programs had 15«- to 16-hour days, beginning with reveille no later than 5 to 6 a.m. and ending with lights out by 9 to 10 p.m. Daytime activities, however, differed somewhat at each site. Looking first at the activities normally associated with military boot camps--military training and drill, work, and physical conditioning--Cleveland devoted 3¬ hours to them each day, compared with 5¬ hours in Mobile and 8 hours in Denver. Conversely, Denver devoted the least time each day to education and life skills programs, 4 hours, while Mobile devoted 7 hours and Cleveland scheduled 5ţ hours. Cleveland also regularly scheduled an hour of counseling beyond what was offered in its life skills curriculum. The camps' program schedules confirmed the researchers' opinion, acquired through observation and interviews, that Denver provided the most militaristic setting and Cleveland the least, and that Mobile placed the heaviest emphasis on educational achievement. Participant Misconduct and Discipline Sanctions All three boot camps had a written policy governing sanctions for participant misconduct. Overall, there were two broad levels of sanctions: o Summary punishment, or sanctions that could be imposed on the spot, at the discretion of the drill instructor. o Sanctions that could be imposed only with the review or approval of some higher authority. Summary punishment or on-the-spot sanctions for misconduct were reserved primarily for less serious breaches of rules. In Denver and Mobile, this form of misconduct might result in a stern reprimand, extra exercise, such as pushups, or extra work detail. In Denver, DI's could place a youth in the brig for up to 24 hours without review, although it is not known how often summary "sentences" as long as 24 hours actually occurred. (In practice, the distinction between summary punishment and reviewed sanctions was blurred in Denver. If the camp commandant was present when brig time was imposed, he could review the punishment and modify it if he saw fit.) Staff concluded that some youths preferred brig time to the rigors of the boot camp regimen. More serious breaches of discipline were referred up the chain of command--to the camp commander in Denver or to the head drill instructor or the camp director in Mobile--for imposition of a sanction. In Mobile, the most serious infractions were heard by a disciplinary board composed of the camp director, the head DI, the academic and the life skills coordinators, and the probation supervisor. In these instances, the disciplinary board heard testimony from witnesses and dismissed the charges or imposed punishment accordingly. Punishments in Denver and Mobile could involve several days in the brig (or isolation room), although most punishments were lighter. In general, this sanctioning system was patterned after military procedures. However, Mobile's disciplinary system, under its first director, was distinctive in that it often used meaningless work as a form of punishment. Cleveland's system of sanctions, adapted from procedures in other nonmilitary programs run by NAFI, was more elaborate than either Denver's or Mobile's. It involved an explicit progression of punishments. At the low end of the spectrum, sanctions ranged from "suggestions" to "directives" (orders) to "confrontation." At the upper end, sanctions included client contracts and physical control or restraint, the latter used when a youth was out of control and perceived to be a danger to himself or others. Intermediate sanctions included separation for counseling, "incentive exercise" (e.g., pushups), and work detail. As in the other two sites, Cleveland's DI's could handle less serious misconduct or misconduct requiring immediate intervention on their own, while a board was convened for the most serious infractions. Minor infractions were often dealt with during the daily guided group interaction session. Youths were rarely observed doing incentive exercise in Cleveland, although elsewhere it was common for DI's to impose extra exercise as punishment. The disciplinary systems all borrowed one important element from the military model. DI's could punish an individual or the entire platoon, even for the misconduct of just one member. One improperly made bed might mean that everyone had to remake their beds, or one youth's misconduct might cost the whole group some privilege. Group rewards and punishments were expected to help produce peer pressure for compliance and instill a sense of individual responsibility to the group. In Mobile, the whole platoon could be put before the disciplinary board. In addition to specifying how and when different levels of sanctions might be applied, all sites had rules setting limits on DI behavior. For example, DI's were forbidden to use vulgar, profane, or humiliating language, including ethnic epithets, and physical contact with recruits was limited to certain prescribed situations. Departures from the approved standards were not observed at any of the camps during onsite visits. However, staff reported that there were lapses, and all three sites dismissed at least one staff person for failing to follow approved disciplinary procedures. In Mobile, for instance, a staff member was disciplined for breaking the rules regarding use of the barrack's TV monitor, which taped the barrack's activities 24 hours a day. In Denver a DI was dismissed for violating personal contact rules after he taped a youth's mouth shut. Setbacks In addition to their regular policies for sanctioning misbehavior, Cleveland and Mobile had a provision for delaying a youth's graduation from boot camp. In both sites, youths earned points daily and platoons earned points weekly that determined their privileges and attainment of levels. In Cleveland, a negative review (or a serious infraction) could cause a youth to be held back an extra 30 days, in effect demoting him to the platoon that entered after his own. This demotion could occur just once, however. Mobile's system was more elaborate, and setbacks were used more frequently. Although the system allowed setbacks up to 30 days, the usual setback was for a week, and a recruit could win back days for good behavior and rejoin his original platoon. Denver had no setback system, although DI's rated each youth weekly, and there was a formal evaluation of behavior every 45 days. The youth, his case manager, the camp commander, and the youth's lead DI all participated in the evaluation meeting. Although Denver did not allow setbacks, three youths (3.9 percent of the camp's first-year participants) repeated the program after having been expelled. Termination The most serious sanction a youth could receive was termination from the program. Termination could occur as a result of a single act, such as escape from the facility or assault on a staff member, or it could occur as a result of a continuing pattern of misconduct. Programs initially did not have explicit policies governing termination, and to a large extent, this remained at the discretion of staff. However, after its first escapes, Cleveland adopted a firm policy that youths who were absent from the camp for over 48 hours would not be permitted to return. Youths absent for over 24 hours would not be readmitted unless they had voluntarily returned to camp. The single infraction most likely to lead to termination in Denver and Mobile was escape. In Cleveland, it was assault against staff, with escape ranking second. At every site, however, some escapees and assaulters were returned to the program. Mobile was the most likely to retain escapees. However, attempted escape in Mobile resulted in an automatic sentence of 72 hours in isolation. Youths might leave boot camp prematurely for other than disciplinary reasons, most notably because of a physical or psychological problem. In theory, youths at all three sites could also quit the programs, although entry to boot camp had been voluntary only in Cleveland. All sites discouraged quitting. For instance, Cleveland youths had to complete a long series of steps in order to quit. In any case, staff reported that in practice, youths typically "quit" by running away or by becoming so uncooperative and disruptive that the boot camp expelled them. In Denver, staff believed that at least three youths faked suicide attempts to prompt their removal from the program. Consequences of Termination Presumably, if the consequences of termination were predictable and adverse, youths would be more likely to comply with the boot camps' regimens. And, indeed, in Cleveland the consequences of termination were predictable and adverse. Youths who were expelled from boot camp were returned to either DYS or the county's residential program to serve their backup sentence, which was always longer than the 90-day boot camp regimen. In Denver and Mobile, the situation was not so clear cut. In Denver, youths who had been committed to DYS were returned to an assessment center for reassessment and reassignment. This process likely involved a waiting period in a detention facility and eventual transfer to another secure residential placement. But youths referred by the Denver probation department and all youths in Mobile were returned to court for imposition of a new penalty. This policy could result in a more severe punishment, but the outcome depended on the probation officer's recommendation and, ultimately, the judge's discretion. Infractions and Sanctions: Experience of the First-Year Platoons As part of the evaluation, systematic information was collected about the infractions committed by youths in boot camp and the sanctions applied. The scope of this research was limited to serious rule infractions, however, because all sites required staff to document them. It should be noted that sites may have differed in the completeness of their documentation and the way they defined a "serious" infraction. There are some indications, for instance, that Denver kept less complete records of disciplinary actions, potentially deflating its overall infraction rate. As a result, only the most serious of the infractions across sites--escape, attempted escape, assaults against staff, and other assaults or fighting--are discussed and compared. These infractions were more consistently documented at every site than infractions such as disobedience. The number of serious infractions per youth in Mobile averaged 3.4, versus 2.6 in Cleveland and 1.9 in Denver. Whereas all sites experienced escapes, Mobile had by far the largest number, 34, versus 6 in Cleveland and 8 in Denver. Mobile also had more attempted escapes, although here the number was much closer to that experienced by the other sites. Escape and attempted escape rates in Mobile appeared to be well above the norm in juvenile facilities nationwide, according to data reported in Conditions of Confinement, a nationwide survey of juvenile detention and corrections facilities conducted in 1991 (Parent, Lieter, Kennedy, Livens, Wentworth, and Wilcox, 1994). That study reported an overall escape and attempted escape rate of 2.46 per 100 juveniles in facilities of all types, a rate of 2.72 for training schools, and a rate of 4.77 for ranches. Mobile's escape and attempted escape rate were estimated to be about 8 per 100. Denver's rate, at 4.6, also appeared somewhat above average, unless ranches are used as the standard. Cleveland's rate, 1.8, was below average. The methods used to calculate rates differ somewhat from those used in the Conditions of Confinement study, however, so it would be unwise to attach too much significance to precise numbers. As for assaults against staff, 20 were reported for the first-year platoons. Seventeen of them occurred in Cleveland and three in Mobile. No assaults against staff were reported in Denver. Infractions involving assaults or fighting among the youths were considerably more common than assaults against staff. Again, this behavior was least frequent in Denver. Overall, the most common serious infractions at the three camps were assaults or fighting among participants, disobedience or insubordination, and "loss of bearing," a term that covers a variety of behaviors deemed inappropriate for a boot camp participant, such as swearing, inappropriate dress, or roughhousing. Another way to look at serious infractions is to consider what proportion of participants committed each type of infraction. First, the proportion of youths who escaped from boot camp varied widely-- from almost 1 in 4 in Mobile to 1 in 9 in Denver to about 1 in 15 in Cleveland. These differences cannot be explained by the relatively minor differences in the physical security of the three facilities. Instead, there may have been differences across sites in the nature of supervision or in the propensities of youths to run away. The distance from one's home turf may have discouraged some potential escapees, for instance. Mobile's program is located near the center of the city. In contrast, Cleveland's boot camp is 30 miles away, and Denver's program, although not in quite as remote a location as Cleveland's, is still several miles from downtown Denver. Differences in escapes may also reflect the relative onerousness of the boot camp regimen or the punishments imposed for attempting to escape. Unfortunately, these factors are difficult to disentangle. For example, Cleveland, with the lowest escape rates, combined the least militaristic program with potentially the most adverse consequences for escape. Youths in Denver were relatively unlikely to have been charged with assaultive infractions, whereas nearly two-thirds of youths in Mobile had an assault or fight on their boot camp records. In Cleveland, over 40 percent had been involved in such an incident. As noted before, no assaults against staff were recorded in Denver. In Mobile, 2.5 percent of the youths assaulted staff, and in Cleveland, 13.8 percent did so. Each site had distinctive preferences for certain types of sanctions. Over half of Mobile's participants served time in the camp's isolation room or were assigned extra duty as a punishment for a serious rule infraction. Loss of privileges and letters of apology were the only other sanctions meted out with any regularity in Mobile. In Denver, too, the majority of youths in first- year platoons served time in the brig, with extra duty the only other sanction meted out to more than 10 percent of the participants. Cleveland's pattern was quite different. The only sanction experienced by a majority of participants was counseling or "redirection," a program- specific term that describes other kinds of verbal responses to misbehavior. Restraint, which refers to the practice of physically holding or constraining the movements of a youth who is out of control, and loss of privileges were the next most common responses to misbehavior. Few youths in Cleveland spent time in isolation because Cleveland had no "brig." It is tempting to speculate about the relationships between styles of discipline and the incidence of serious infractions, such as assaults and fighting reported above. However, no persuasive hypotheses can be offered. Although Cleveland, for instance, relied less than the other sites on traditional forms of military discipline and had the highest rate of assaults against staff, other factors may have been more significant. As reported in chapter 3, youths in Cleveland had more extensive criminal records than did participants in Mobile or Denver. Also, while commenting on the low rates of assault in Denver, the Denver camp commander noted that his staff tended to be older than those at the other boot camps and, therefore, may have had an easier time establishing and maintaining authority. Of the youths in first-year platoons set back for poor performance or specific misconduct, about 8 percent of youths were set back in Cleveland, whereas 31 percent were set back in Mobile. All of those set back in Cleveland eventually graduated. In contrast, 7 (18.4 percent) of the 38 setbacks in Mobile failed to graduate. As noted earlier, Denver did not use setbacks as a sanction. Boot Camp Graduation and Termination Rates The programs' most serious sanction is removal from boot camp. Of the youths who successfully completed boot camp and entered an aftercare program, the Cleveland program achieved the highest graduation rate, with 94.1 percent of its first-year participants completing boot camp. Completion rates in Denver and Mobile were lower, at 80.3 percent and 82 percent, respectively. The majority of terminations in Cleveland and Mobile occurred because of attempted escape. The next most common reason for termination was noncompliance with the program. Mobile also lost three participants because of physical or psychological problems. Reasons for termination from the Denver program were more varied. Of the 15 youths who failed to graduate, 6 were disruptive or otherwise noncompliant, 3 escaped, 5 were removed for medical reasons, and 1 was removed for a combination of medical problems and poor performance. Three of the five youths removed from that program for medical reasons were involved in suicide attempts, as was the youth removed for both medical problems and poor performance. The timing of removals from boot camp was also examined to determine if there were any trends. In particular, it was important to know if there were more program removals during the first 4 months of program operation. In contrast, Denver's termination rate was relatively constant throughout most of the first year, declining only slightly toward the end. To determine if there were any periods during which youths were at particular risk of dropping out, dropout was examined as a function of time in the boot camp. In both Cleveland and Denver, the majority of youths who were going to drop out did so within the camp's first 2 weeks. These early dropouts could be considered to be a type of participant selection error that was identified soon after transfer. In Mobile, however, the first 2 weeks of the program accounted for just 27 percent of boot camp losses, and a relatively large number of Mobile youths dropped out after the 10-week mark. Some of these late dropouts were youths who had been recycled. Attitudes of Youths Toward the Boot Camp Regimens In light of the preceding description of the boot camps' structure and discipline, it would be useful to know how the participants assessed the programs. Two measures of the attitudes of participants toward the regimens are available: o Informal interviews with youths belonging to the first or second platoon at each site conducted by evaluation staff during site visits. o Rating form responses from a number of youths who had reached the eighth month in the demonstration program and were participating in aftercare at that time. In both surveys, unfortunately, the respondents were a small and nonrepresentative sample of all youths who participated in the camps. The reactions of these youths are included, however, because they may be of interest to some readers. Results were difficult to interpret given the limited samples involved. Many of those participants most unhappy or most unsuited to boot camp were no longer available to express their opinions when th